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Shady Grove
CLASS ACTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF ERIE
In the 2010 case Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1 a divided Supreme Court issued
a plurality opinion that sparked new debate about the role of
the Erie doctrine, viewed through the lens of divergent national
and state rules regarding class action certification. The 1938
landmark case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 gave rise to the
Erie doctrine, which—to address federalism concerns—offers a
solution to choice-of-law conflicts between federal and state
rules in diversity suits. The Erie doctrine is particularly
important where variance between national and state laws
could result in different litigation outcomes depending on the
particular rule applied. At first glance, the Erie doctrine
appears to be a straightforward rule. In order to prevent forum
shopping and an inequitable distribution of the laws,3 “federal
courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law.”4
Despite its seeming simplicity, the Erie doctrine leads to
numerous complications for a variety of reasons. The
Constitution recognizes both the federal government and state
governments as sovereign in their respective territories, with
the federal government having ultimate supremacy.5 Both the
1

130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3
For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, including its “twin aims” of preventing (1)
forum shopping and (2) an inequitable distribution of the laws, see infra Part II.
4
See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)
(“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive
and federal procedural law.”); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
5
See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
In Erie, the Supreme Court explained:
2

[The Constitution] recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence
of the States—independence in their legislative and . . . in their judicial
departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of
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states and the federal government are authorized to create
laws dealing with procedural processes and substantive issues,
but the line between substance and procedure is not always
distinct.6 Moreover, the United States legal system recognizes
the authority of both statutory and common law, and judicial
commentary on congressional legislation sheds light on the
meaning of statutory rules and standards. However, for federal
courts sitting in diversity, the Erie doctrine states that only
federal rules stemming from the Constitution or congressional
legislation preempt state law.7 Therefore, in cases heard under
diversity jurisdiction, federal common law “has been eliminated
as a source of substantive rights for claims based on state law.”8
Because of the multiple and often overlapping layers of
authority in American jurisprudence, the application of the
Erie doctrine can become a complex endeavor for federal courts.
Class-action certification illustrates the complexity
between the applicability of federal laws to the issue at hand
and the substance/procedure dichotomy. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 23 governs class action certification, a
necessary procedural step in pursuing a class action.9 In theory,

the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution
specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference
with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the
State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
6
For a discussion of the dichotomy between substance and procedure, see
infra Part III.
7
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen,
Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie
Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 737 (2006) (“Most conflicts between state and federal law
are not even conceived of as Erie problems, but simply as routine issues under the
Supremacy Clause. If the Constitution determines an issue, as it does the right to jury
trial in federal court, then state law must give way. So, too, federal legislation, so long
as it is constitutional, has the same preemptive effect on state law . . . .”).
8
Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 737; see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78
(“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general’ . . . . And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”); infra Part II
(discussing the development of the Erie jurisprudence).
9
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
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class actions promote efficiency by offering a procedural
mechanism for parties to aggregate claims.10 For example, when
a court certifies a plaintiff class,11 plaintiffs can pool—and
courts can conserve—their resources, and defendants can avoid
the burdens of defending against multiple lawsuits (including
discovery costs).12 However, states also have laws regulating
the certification of class actions. Because of the lucrative
nature of class actions, particularly for plaintiffs’ attorneys,
states have passed varying laws regarding class action
certification.13 Some states have laws that are more plaintifffriendly, while other states, such as New York, have laws that
are more restrictive of class certification.14
In the 1970s, New York passed section 901 of the New
York Civil Practice Law to limit the enormous rewards often
granted to plaintiffs in class actions.15 Section 901(a) largely

(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is
satisfied and if:
...
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
10
Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action
Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1793 n.1 (2009); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (stating that class actions
are procedural aggregation devices that do not change the rights of litigants).
11
Although defendants may also pursue class certification, it is a mechanism
more often employed by plaintiffs. For a discussion of the legislative history behind the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) [hereinafter CAFA], see
infra Part IV.A. Congress enacted CAFA largely because of vastly divergent state laws
regarding class certification that led to abuse by plaintiffs’ attorneys.
12
York-Erwin, supra note 10, at 1799.
13
For a discussion of the legislative history of CAFA, see infra Part IV.A
14
See infra Part IV.A.
15
Section 901 of New York State Civil Practice law provides:
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise
required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members;
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parallels the language of Rule 23,16 but section 901(b)
additionally states, “Unless a statute creating or imposing a
penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically
authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to
recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.”17
Thus, section 901(b) prevents certification of suits where
plaintiffs seek solely to recover a “penalty.”
In 2005, Congress attempted to bring increasingly
common nationwide class actions under federal jurisdiction
with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).18 Congress wanted
to address the consequences of multistate class actions on
interstate commerce and the perceived abuses in class-actionfriendly states, where plaintiffs’ lawyers manipulated the class
mechanism to pressure defendants into settlement.19 Through
CAFA, Congress gave federal jurisdiction to most nationwide
class actions.20 CAFA permits plaintiffs to file any class action
in federal court (or defendants to remove any class action to
federal court) if (1) minimum diversity requirements are met
and (2) the amount in controversy aggregates to at least $5
million.21 Thus, Congress expanded diversity jurisdiction for
class actions, most notably by eliminating the requirement of
complete diversity. Even when class-action claims arise under

3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.
b. Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an
action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (McKinney 2010).
16
See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 22 (2010) (“New York law includes
a provision specifically addressing the availability of statutory-penalty or minimumdamage remedies in a class proceeding, which was enacted when New York updated its
general class action provision following the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 23.”).
17
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b).
18
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
19
See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
20
York-Erwin, supra note 10, at 1804.
21
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
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state law, CAFA permits federal courts to hear those claims.22
Recently, in Shady Grove, the Supreme Court analyzed
whether Rule 23 and section 901(b) could coexist in New York
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear class actions under
CAFA.23 The question before the court was, “if state law
assesses the propriety of a class action differently than a
federal court would, when (if ever) must the federal court follow
state law rather than the prevailing federal approach?”24
This note argues that the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals and Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Shady Grove
25
correctly concluded that section 901 can coexist with Rule 23.
Indeed, Section 901 does not directly conflict with Rule 23
because section 901 imposes procedural limits on New York legal
remedies, a substantive interest that belongs under state
26
jurisdiction. This note follows Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and
proposes that, in light of the Shady Grove decision, Congress
should rewrite CAFA to preserve its original aim of controlling
ballooning class-action litigation while still respecting states’
rights to govern their laws. As Justice Ginsburg suggested,
Congress should amend CAFA by adding a provision that
prevents federal courts from certifying state-law class actions
27
that could not be brought in state courts. This proposal stays
true to the legislative intent behind CAFA by permitting states,
as well as the federal government, to enact policies that curb
28
class action abuse. The proposal also comports with many other
CAFA carve-outs in which local interests supersede CAFA’s

22

Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1132 (2011). See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d).
23
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1436 (2010).
24
Steinman, supra note 22, at 1132.
25
See id. at 1143 (“Shady Grove became a 5-4 decision . . . because only four
Justices (led by Justice Ginsburg) were able to reconcile Federal Rule 23 and § 901(b).
For Justice Scalia and the majority, the conflict between Federal Rule 23 and § 901(b)
was unavoidable.” (footnote omitted)).
26
For a discussion of the substantive nature of statutory damages, see infra
Part III.D; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses
of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1925 (2006) (“Because avowedly
procedural rules may have either substantive purposes or substantive effects,
consideration should be given to the political legitimacy of the process by which they
are formulated or applied and of the actors who are formulating or applying them.
Rather than giving up on the procedure/substance dichotomy, we should craft it with
attention to its ultimately political ramifications.”).
27
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28
See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
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29

grant of federal jurisdiction. This proposal acknowledges the
inherent substantive state interests in regulating class actions
arising under state law. It discourages vertical forum shopping
and helps to ensure an equitable application of the law in both
30
federal and state courts. Moreover, the proposal does not
permit a federal rule to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive
31
state right. Part I of this note will discuss the background and
facts of Shady Grove. Part II will explain the Erie doctrine, the
development of Erie jurisprudence, and applicable limitations on
state legislatures. Part III will analyze the Supreme Court’s
error in failing to apply the correct Erie analysis in Shady Grove.
Finally, Part IV will suggest a solution to the Supreme Court’s
flawed analysis in Shady Grove by proposing that Congress
amend CAFA to prevent similar mistakes and to affirm state
sovereignty.
I.

SHADY GROVE: BACKGROUND AND FACTS

In Shady Grove, Sonia Galvez received treatment from
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, located in Maryland, for
her injuries resulting from a car accident.32 Allstate Insurance
Company insured Galvez, and her policy, issued in New York,
was governed by New York law.33 The cause of action in Shady
Grove arose out of New York Insurance Law section 5106(a),
which provides statutory interest on overdue benefits.34 Under
section 5106(a), once Shady Grove filed Galvez’s claim with
Allstate, the insurance company had thirty days to pay the
claim or deny it.35 Although Allstate eventually paid Shady
Grove, Allstate did not timely do so, and statutory interest (at a
rate of two percent a month) accrued on the overdue benefit.36
Shady Grove could have individually pursued a claim for the
interest against Allstate in New York state court. However,
section 901(b), with its provision preventing the use of class
29

For a discussion of the carve-outs in the Class Action Fairness Act, see
infra Part IV.C.
30
See infra Part II for a discussion of the “twin aims” of Erie: (1) to
discourage forum shopping; and (2) to avoid the inequitable administration of the laws.
31
For a discussion of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), see
infra Part II.
32
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. (noting that under New York law, Allstate had thirty days to pay or
deny the claim once Shady Grove submitted it).
36
Id.
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actions to pursue statutory damages,37 forced the Shady Grove
plaintiffs to pursue their class-wide claim in federal court.38
Shady Grove’s individual claims totaled only $500, but the
aggregated claims of all similarly situated plaintiffs totaled
over $5 million.39 Therefore, the Shady Grove plaintiffs met the
minimal diversity and amount-in-controversy requirements to
file the suit in federal court under CAFA.40 The District Court
for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the suit,
reasoning that Shady Grove was precluded from bringing a
class action by section 901(b).41 On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed the Eastern District’s holding, noting that no conflict
existed between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and section
901(b) “because they address different issues.”42 The Second
Circuit held that Rule 23 controls the criteria for class
certification, whereas section 901(b) governs the threshold
question of “whether the particular type of claim is eligible for
class treatment in the first place—a question on which Rule 23
is silent.”43 Like the Eastern District, the Second Circuit held
that section 901(b) is substantive rather than procedural, and
therefore federal courts sitting in diversity had to apply it
under the Erie doctrine.44
The Supreme Court overturned both lower courts’
analyses. In a plurality opinion,45 the Supreme Court declared
section 901(b) to be a procedural rule in direct conflict with
Rule 23. The Court first held that Rule 23 governed class
certification, a procedural mechanism, for federal courts sitting
in diversity.46 In his analysis, Justice Scalia ignored the
substantive implications of rules governing class action
certification47 and found that if Rule 23 requirements are met,

37

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (McKinney 2010).
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
39
Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
40
Id. at 1436-37 (majority opinion).
41
Id. at 1437.
42
Id. at 1438. For a discussion of the substantive nature of section 901(b) that
could be incorporated into a federal court’s interpretation of Rule 23, see infra Part III.D.
43
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.
44
Id. at 1437.
45
Justice Thomas, Justice Sotomayor, and Chief Justice Roberts joined
Justice Scalia’s opinion; Justice Stevens concurred in judgment, and thus a majority of
the Court stated that Rule 23, not section 901(b), governed class action certification
procedures in New York federal courts sitting in diversity. Justice Ginsburg wrote the
dissent, joined by Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. See id. at 1435.
46
Id. at 1448.
47
For a discussion of the substantive issues underlying class actions, see
infra Parts III.D and IV.A.
38
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then federal courts must certify classes.48 Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment, reached the same conclusion as
Justice Scalia, although he advocated for a nuanced, case-bycase analysis of federal rules by using a balancing test that
would “not necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue
takes the form of what is traditionally described as substantive
or procedural. Rather, it [would turn] on whether the state law
actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or
remedies.”49 The plurality did not address the fact that Shady
Grove was in federal court only because of the jurisdictional
grant in CAFA. The Shady Grove decision distorted the intent
of CAFA and expanded the right of plaintiffs to pursue class
actions arising under a single state’s laws in federal court.50
Additionally, Shady Grove increased the power of the federal
government to hear class actions arising under state law at the
expense of the state’s substantive interest to curb the
certification of damage classes, which are classes formed to
obtain solely monetary relief.51
II.

FEDERALISM: THE RULES OF DECISION ACT, THE RULES
ENABLING ACT, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ERIE
JURISPRUDENCE

The conflicting interpretations given to the meaning of
Rule 23 and section 901(b) by the Supreme Court and the New
York federal courts reflect a longstanding choice-of-law
problem for federal courts in the American system. Diversity
jurisdiction,52 which allows federal courts to hear claims arising
under state laws, creates a situation where federal courts must
decide whether to apply state or federal laws, including
procedural and common law rules. In Erie Railroad Co. v.
48

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439.
Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring).
50
One of the reasons Congress expanded federal jurisdiction under CAFA
was to prevent states from certifying and deciding nationwide or multistate class
actions, thereby binding other states and creating federalism concerns. For a
discussion of CAFA’s legislative history, see infra Part IV.A.
51
See infra Part IV.A. While Congress intended to increase the power of the
federal government to hear class action disputes through CAFA, it did so because
plaintiff friendly states were too easily certifying classes, leading to a variety of
problems. CAFA was not passed out of concern that some states limited the ability to
pursue class actions for certain claims. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005: Findings and Purposes of CAFA, in 1 LITIGATING TORT CASES
§ 9:28 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2010); see also infra Part
III (discussing the substantive interest behind state limitations on statutory damages).
52
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
49
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Tompkins,53 the Supreme Court, in deciding whether to apply the
Pennsylvania or the federal common law standard in evaluating
the duty owed to trespassers, addressed the choice-of-law issue
in diversity suits.54 With deference to underlying principles of
federalism and separation of powers,55 the Erie Court applied the
Pennsylvania standard and held, “Except in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State.”56 As interpreted in
subsequent decisions, the Erie doctrine differentiated between
substantive and procedural rules.57 The Erie Court permitted
federal courts to apply federal procedural rules, but it declared
the end of federal substantive common law for courts hearing a
matter under diversity jurisdiction.58
In explicating this decision, the Erie Court sought to
address two major problems inherent within the applicability
of divergent federal and state laws in diversity jurisdiction (the
“twin aims” of Erie). First, Erie attempts to prevent the
inequitable distribution of laws between citizens and
noncitizens of a state. Under diversity jurisdiction, noncitizen
plaintiffs have the privilege to pursue their state-law claims in
state or federal courts (depending on the favorableness of
applicable rules), which gives noncitizens an option not available
to state-law litigants who are citizens of the state in which the
action is brought.59 The second aim of Erie seeks to prevent
vertical forum shopping, which occurs when noncitizen plaintiffs
elect to bring a claim in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction, because the federal court’s rules are more
favorable.60 Fundamentally, “The Erie rule is rooted in part in a

53

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 70.
55
Id. at 78; see also John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 693, 706 & n.77 (1974).
56
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
57
See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996);
see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he
scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making functions between
state and federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can
make substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional
legislative powers in this regard.”). See infra Part III (discussing the
substance/procedure dichotomy).
58
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“There is no federal general common law.”).
59
Id. at 74-77.
60
Id. Vertical forum shopping occurs when plaintiffs choose to pursue their
claims in federal court instead of state court, depending on the favorability of
applicable rules. In contrast, CAFA purported to prevent horizontal forum shopping,
whereby plaintiffs would choose to bring their claims among various states, again
54
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realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a
litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought
in a federal court.”61 Through this allocation of power between
the federal and state governments, the Erie doctrine “implicates,
indeed perhaps it is, the very essence of our federalism.”62
Two federal statutes play essential roles in Erie
jurisprudence and further explicate the applicable law for
diversity actions.63 The first is the Rules of Decision Act (RDA),64
which was originally a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
was the basis of the Court’s holding in Erie.65 The Rules of
Decision Act states, “The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.”66 The Rules of Decision Act
applies in situations where there is no federal constitutional or
statutory rule that governs the issue at hand. Like the Erie
doctrine itself, it prevents federal courts sitting in diversity
from creating a federal substantive “common law” that could
supersede state authority.67 Because “this restraint serves a
policy of prime importance to our federal system,”68 the
Supreme Court has often “applied the [Rules of Decision] Act
‘with an eye alert to . . . avoiding disregard of State law.’”69
The second federal statute of importance to the Erie
doctrine is the 1934 Rules Enabling Act (REA),70 in which
Congress delegated to the Supreme Court71 “the power to
depending on the favorability of state law. For a discussion of horizontal forum
shopping, see infra Part IV.A.
61
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467.
62
Ely, supra note 55, at 695.
63
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1460-61 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
65
Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-72 (citing the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24,
1789, c. 20, 28 U.S.C. § 725).
66
28 U.S.C. § 1652.
67
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Erie,
304 U.S. at 78).
68
Id. at 1461.
69
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
110 (1945)).
70
28 U.S.C. § 2072.
71
See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 738-39 (“A federal statute requires
affirmative action by both houses of Congress while a federal rule does not. . . . All that is
required for a federal rule to take effect is a failure by Congress to act. The actual drafting of
the rules is undertaken by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Standing
Committee on Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, whose proposals are submitted for
approval to the Judicial Conference and then to the Supreme Court.”).

2012]

SHADY GROVE

793

prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases
in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals”72
so long as these rules do “not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”73 This limitation is important, because the
Constitution grants Congress—not the Supreme Court—the
authority to make law.74 The Rules Enabling Act restricts the
Court to enacting procedural, but not substantive, provisions.75
The Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.76 In Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co.,77 the Supreme Court articulated the relevant
analysis to determine the scope of a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure in light of the restrictions against “abridg[ing],
enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] any substantive right.”78 It held that
“[t]he test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,—
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them.”79 Ultimately, when
determining whether to follow federal or state law, federal
courts sitting in diversity follow either the Rules of Decision
Act (if there is no federal provision on point) or the Rules
Enabling Act (if there is an applicable federal provision).80
In Hanna v. Plumer,81 the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the interplay among the Erie doctrine, the Rules of
Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act in diversity actions.
The issue in Hanna involved a conflict between Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d)(1) and a Massachusetts state law, which
provided different mechanisms for proper service of process.82
Because a federal procedural rule, passed pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, governed the issue in Hanna, the Court
upheld the federal rule over the state rule.83 Unlike Erie, the
72

28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
Id. § 2072(b).
74
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
75
28 U.S.C. § 2072.
76
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1461 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77
312 U.S. 1 (1941).
78
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (“In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress
authorized this Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review, but with
the limitation that those rules ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))).
79
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
80
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442.
81
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
82
Id. at 461-62.
83
Id. at 463-64.
73
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federal rule at issue in Hanna was not derived from the
common law. The Hanna Court concluded that the supremacy
of federal constitutional and statutory law, unlike the federal
common law at issue in Erie, mandated that federal courts,
even when sitting in diversity and hearing a case arising under
state law, apply the conflicting federal provision.84 Federalism
inherently leads to some divergence between federal and state
law, and the Court stated, “To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode
of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either
the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or
Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”85
Hanna established a two-prong choice-of-law test for
federal courts sitting in diversity. Under the test, the threshold
question for the court is whether there is a federal
constitutional or statutory mandate or rule of civil procedure
that governs the dispute.86 If there is, then the court follows the
Hanna prong and applies the federal provision unless it is
unconstitutional or otherwise limited; Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure cannot violate the Rules Enabling Act by abridging,
enlarging, or modifying a substantive state right.87 Congress
has the power to prescribe procedural rules for federal courts,
even if they may sometimes differ from the rules used in state
courts.88 The Hanna prong accepts the inequitable distribution
of laws and forum shopping as inevitable consequences of a
federal system in which the national government has ultimate
supremacy over the states.89
On the other hand, if there is no federal provision
governing the dispute, then the court follows the “unguided
Erie” prong,90 governed by the Rules of Decision Act and the
Erie doctrine.91 Under this test, the court will apply federal

84

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473; U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74.
86
Id. at 471-72; Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010).
87
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see also id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“If a Federal Rule controls an issue and directly conflicts with state law, the Rule, so long as
it is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act, applies in diversity suits.”).
88
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473.
89
Id. at 473-74.
90
Id. at 471.
91
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If . . . no
Federal Rule or statute governs the issue, the Rules of Decision Act, as interpreted in
Erie, controls. That Act directs federal courts, in diversity cases, to apply state law
when failure to do so would invite forum-shopping and yield markedly disparate
85

2012]

SHADY GROVE

795

rules that are “procedural” and state rules that are
“substantive,” giving deference to state provisions that involve
specific state interests that extend beyond procedural
regulation.92 If a court’s decision might violate or undermine the
twin aims of Erie, then the court must follow the state law.93
Therefore, a conflict between a state law and a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, created through the Rules Enabling Act,
involves a different analysis than that of an unguided choice
mandated by the Erie doctrine.94 The Hanna Court explained
the differences between the two tests:
It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly,
that federal courts are to apply state “substantive” law and federal
“procedural” law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are
identical. For they were designed to control very different sorts of
decisions. When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules,
the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively
unguided Erie Choice: the court has been instructed to apply the
Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if . . . this Court, and
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor
constitutional restrictions.95

Despite the Hanna Court’s attempt at explaining the
difference in analysis between an unguided Erie decision and
one involving the application of a federal rule under the Hanna
prong, “precise guidance has been lacking for both the ‘twin
aims’ standard that governs unguided Erie choices and the
[Rules Enabling Act]’s substantive-rights provision that
governs the validity of a Federal Rule.”96 At least in theory, the
unguided Erie prong and the Hanna prong restrict federal
encroachment of state substantive law.97 Still, the Supreme
Court has never held that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
litigation outcomes.” (citations omitted)); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-74; Steinman, supra
note 22, at 1134-35.
92
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72.
93
See supra note 91; see also supra notes 3-4.
94
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-71.
95
Id. at 471.
96
Steinman, supra note 22, at 1136.
97
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1463 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[B]oth before and after Hanna, the abovedescribed decisions show, federal courts have been cautioned by this Court to
‘interpre[t] the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests’ and a
will ‘to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.’” (quoting Gasperini v.
Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 & 438 n.22 (1996))); Hanna, 380 U.S. at
468 (“Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations not likely to raise the sort of
equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely to
influence the choice of a forum.”).
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violated the REA.98 Because the application of the Hanna prong
usually leads to the application of the federal rule, and the Erie
prong usually leads to the application of the state rule, these
tests may lead to vertical forum shopping, a problem the Erie
doctrine attempted to prevent.99 For example, a party that
seeks the application of a federal rule may choose to bring the
action in federal court (or remove) and argue under Hanna that
the federal rule governs the issue at hand. On the other hand,
a party that seeks the application of a state rule will bring the
action in state court, where the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure cannot reach. If that action is removed to federal
court, then the party that seeks application of the state rule
will argue that the applicable federal rule is not broad enough
to govern the issue. Therefore, federalism concerns arise in
choice-of-law decisions for federal courts sitting in diversity.
In her dissent in Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg
articulated a nuanced analysis of the choice-of-law decisions by
emphasizing the importance of federalism principles. Like the
Hanna court, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the
threshold issue in determining whether to follow the Hanna
prong or the unguided Erie prong is whether there is an
applicable federal rule on point.100 However, Justice Ginsburg
did not entirely separate the RDA from the REA. She pointed
out that both play integral roles when federal courts choose the
appropriate route. Justice Ginsburg explained, “Recognizing
that the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act
simultaneously frame and inform the Erie analysis, we have
endeavored in diversity suits to remain safely within the
bounds of both congressional directives.”101
Despite the Hanna Court’s attempt to offer a twopronged analysis for choice-of-law decisions and despite the
extensive analysis given to the Erie doctrine in numerous
98

See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442-43 (“[W]e have rejected every
statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us. We have found to be in
compliance with § 2072(b) rules prescribing methods for serving process, and requiring
litigants whose mental or physical condition is in dispute to submit to examinations.
Likewise, we have upheld rules authorizing imposition of sanctions upon those who file
frivolous appeals, or who sign court papers without a reasonable inquiry into the facts
asserted. Each of these rules had some practical effect on the parties’ rights, but each
undeniably regulated only the process for enforcing those rights; none altered the
rights themselves, the available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the court
adjudicated either.” (citations omitted)).
99
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
100
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101
Id. (citations omitted). For a discussion on how state interests can inform a
federal court’s interpretation of the federal rules, see infra Parts III.C-D.
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judicial opinions, choice-of-law problems persist for two main
reasons. First, a federal rule’s applicability to an issue is not
always clear.102 As Justice Ginsburg noted, federalism concerns
have led courts to follow the Hanna prong only if they find
“direct collision” between a federal rule and state law.103 Courts
may subjectively apply a broad reading to a federal rule in
order to enlarge its application, or give a narrow reading to a
federal rule in order to limit its application.104 If the court gives
a narrow reading to the federal rule at issue and determines it
does not apply to the facts of the case, then the court must
enter unguided Erie territory, where it must distinguish
between “substantive” and “procedural” rules (while
maintaining a preference for application of the state rule
consistent with the twin aims of Erie).105 This subjectivity can
lead to inconsistent application of the Hanna and Erie prongs,
which can lead to a lack of uniformity and predictability in the
law. The Erie doctrine itself leads to the second main problem:
the line between “substantive” and “procedural” law is often
blurry and is far from a bright-line test.106 In fact, the
distinction between “substance” and “procedure” varies with
the circumstances and facts of each case.107
III.

THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO APPLY ERIE
CORRECTLY IN SHADY GROVE

The Shady Grove plurality opinion misapplied Hanna,
because (1) Rule 23 and section 901(b) do not directly conflict;
and (2) section 901(b)’s statutory limits on penalties are
102

A broad or narrow reading of a federal rule can complicate its applicability
at hand. Like the difference between “substance” and “procedure,” a Federal Rule’s
applicability or lack thereof to the facts at hand is not clear-cut. Cf. Shady Grove, 130
S. Ct. at 1461-63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (analyzing various cases where the court
permitted seemingly contradictory federal and state rules to coexist).
103
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980) (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)).
104
Id. at 749-50 (“The first question must therefore be whether the scope of
the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. It is
only if that question is answered affirmatively that the Hanna analysis applies.”).
105
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
106
See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 194
(2004) (“‘The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy,’ . . . ‘but no one
doubts federal power over procedure.’” (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring))).
107
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (“The line between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’
shifts as the legal context changes. ‘Each implies different variables depending upon
the particular problem for which it is used.’” (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 108 (1945))).
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substantive, not procedural. Because Rule 23 and section
901(b) do not directly collide, the Court should have followed
the unguided Erie prong and applied section 901(b) out of
deference to New York state sovereignty under the Rules of
Decision Act and the Erie doctrine. By applying Rule 23 instead
of section 901(b), the Court exacerbated the problems that the
twin aims of Erie attempted to prevent; the decision will lead to
the inequitable distribution of laws and vertical forum
shopping. Moreover, even if the Court was correct in applying
the Hanna prong because it rightly determined that Rule 23
governed the issue at hand and directly collided with section
901(b), it failed to acknowledge that section 901(b) is a
substantive rule. Thus, even under the Hanna prong, the Court
still should have applied section 901(b) over Rule 23 based on
the REA’s command that federal procedural rules may not
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any [state] substantive right[s].”108
A.

Justice Scalia’s Misapplication of the Hanna Prong in
Shady Grove

In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion,
explained the Court’s approach in dealing with a potential
conflict between a federal rule and a state rule. Justice Scalia
followed the standard framework for a choice of law decision for
federal courts sitting in diversity. He first asked whether Rule
23 governed the issue.109 He noted that, under the Hanna prong,
if Rule 23 were broad enough to cover the issue, then the Court
would have to apply it, despite a conflicting New York law,
unless the rule violated the Constitution or exceeded
congressional authorization under the Rules Enabling Act.110 In
addressing the mandate to avoid abridging, modifying, or
enlarging state substantive rights, Justice Scalia wrote,
The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive
rights; most procedural rules do. What matters is what the rule itself
regulates: If it governs only the manner and means by which the
litigants’ rights are enforced, it is valid; if it alters the rules of
decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights, it is not.111

108

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1437 (2010).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 1442 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
109
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Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court must analyze
the substantive or procedural aspect of the federal, not state,
rule at issue.112 He explained, “the validity of a Federal Rule
depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure. If it
does, it is authorized by [the Rules Enabling Act] and is valid
in all jurisdictions, with respect to all claims, regardless of its
incidental effect upon state-created rights.”113 Based on the test,
Justice Scalia concluded that Rule 23 is validly within the
Rules Enabling Act, because class actions, like traditional
joinder, simply provide a means for multiple parties to
aggregate claims.114 However, Justice Scalia did not find that
class actions change parties’ legal rights and duties or alter
rules of decision.115 Thus, even though the amount at stake for
Allstate in Shady Grove ballooned from what would have been
a $500 claim in state court to a $5 million class action in New
York federal court, Justice Scalia found that Rule 23 did not
“enlarge” any substantive right.116
Instead of recognizing any substantive New York state
interest in limiting damage classes, Justice Scalia determined
that both Rule 23 and section 901(b) were procedural
provisions.117 He stated, “Rule 23 permits all class actions that
meet its requirements, and a State cannot limit that
permission by structuring one part of its statute to track Rule
23 and enacting another part that imposes additional
requirements.”118 Justice Scalia noted that section 901(b) does
not simply cap statutory damages or rule out certain forms of
damages; rather it procedurally inhibits the right to maintain a
class action because “it prevents the class actions it covers from
coming into existence at all.”119
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg pursued a different
approach. She concluded that Rule 23 and section 901(b) apply
to different situations and therefore do not clash; in turn she
analyzed the conflict under the unguided Erie prong rather than
the Hanna prong. Justice Ginsburg, like the Second Circuit and
the Eastern District of New York had held, opined that section
112

Id. at 1444.
Id.
114
Id. at 1443.
115
Id.
116
For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s seemingly conflicting opinion on the
substantive nature of state limitations on statutory damages, see infra Part III.D.
117
For a discussion of the substantive nature of class action damages, see
infra Part III.D.
118
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439.
119
Id.
113
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901(b) pertains to remedies in class actions, a substantive issue,
whereas Rule 23 simply pertains to procedures surrounding
class actions.120 Justice Ginsburg explained,
Rule 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for relief, while
[section] 901(b) defines the dimensions of the claim itself. . . . The New
York Legislature could have embedded the limitation in every
provision creating a cause of action for which a penalty is authorized;
[section] 901(b) operates as shorthand to the same effect.121

Rather than reading section 901(b) as merely a procedural
mechanism that adds a limitation to the provisions of Rule 23,
Justice Ginsburg read the New York law as embodying a
substantive state interest in limiting the crippling effect that
class actions can have on defendants.122 By incorporating New
York’s substantive interests into her reading, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent falls more in line with state sovereignty
principles prevalent in Erie jurisprudence.123
B.

The Erie Prong’s Development: The Outcome
Determinative Test, Federalism, and the Line Between
Substance and Procedure

Justice Scalia saw Rule 23 as valid and procedural under
the Rules Enabling Act, and so he held Rule 23 governed the
issue. Because he analyzed Shady Grove under the Hanna
prong, he did not consider the substantive interests behind New
York’s enactment of section 901(b), which he also found to be
procedural. However, the line between substance and procedure
is rather “murky”;124 procedural devices often have substantive
consequences. Indeed, states often deliberately design class
action procedural protocols to effectuate significant substantive

120

Id. at 1465-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Rule 23 prescribes the
considerations relevant to class certification and postcertification proceedings—but it
does not command that a particular remedy be available when a party sues in a
representative capacity. Section 901(b), in contrast, trains on that latter issue.”
(citations omitted)).
121
Id. at 1466.
122
See id. at 1464-65; see also infra Part III.D (explaining how the Shady
Grove court could have incorporated New York’s substantive interests into its reading
of Rule 23 and section 901(b)).
123
See supra Part II (discussing the development of Erie jurisprudence); see
also Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would continue to
approach Erie questions in a manner mindful of the purposes underlying the Rules of
Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act, faithful to precedent, and respectful of
important state interests.”).
124
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (majority opinion).
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interests.125 While obvious that procedural issues include
litigation protocols and substantive law governs the merits of
the issue litigated, it is equally obvious that procedural rules can
yield substantive consequences on the outcome of litigation.126
Supreme Court jurisprudence illustrates the dilemma
surrounding this substance-versus-procedure dichotomy.
The Supreme Court case Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,127
decided shortly after Erie, illustrates the interplay between
substance and procedure and offers an attempted solution to
the problem. In this shareholder derivative suit, the Court had
to decide whether a federal court sitting in diversity should
apply a state statute of limitations that was shorter than the
federal statute of limitations.128 A statute of limitations,
arguably a procedural device, affects the time period that
individuals have to bring suit. Therefore, application of the
state statute would limit the plaintiffs’ ability to bring their
cause of action.129 The Court reasoned that, for federal courts
hearing cases solely based on diversity jurisdiction, Erie
essentially insured that the rules used, and therefore the
outcome that resulted, would be the same as if the relevant
state court tried the case.130 The Court based its rationale for
this outcome determinative test on the twin aims of Erie: the
inequitable distribution of laws and the prevention of forum
shopping.131 The Court explained, “[F]or the same transaction
the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in federal court
125

Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in Federal Class
Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV., 285, 285 (2010); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1439, 1442 (2008) (“[P]rocedure is power. . . . [A]ll informed observers of the
litigation process now understand that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and state
class action rules, although regulating the process of litigation, can still have major
substantive impact.”). For a discussion of state interests behind rules regarding class
certification, see infra Part IV.A.
126
Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code of State
Civil Procedure: The Virtue of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 971,
989 (2009) (“[I]t is resolving disputes through reasoned and principled deliberation,
based on rules, that is at the heart of adjudication and . . . predefined procedures
provide the methods for vindicating substantive rights.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
127
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
128
Id. at 100-01; see also id. at 113 n. 1 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
129
Id. at 101 (majority opinion).
130
Id. at 109 (“In essence, the intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that,
in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the
diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”).
131
Id.
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instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a
substantially different result.”132
The “outcome determinative” test put forth in Guaranty
Trust is appealing because it seems simple; if the difference
between a state and federal rule would affect the outcome of
the case, then a federal court sitting in diversity should apply
the state rule. However, its simplicity is also its downfall: it
ignores the constitutional reality that the United States is a
federal system, and federal constitutional and statutory law
has supremacy over state law.133 The Court addressed this issue
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,134 which
dealt with the allocation of authority between the judge and
jury in determining an employer’s immunity to a workmen’s
compensation claim.135 While South Carolina law gave the judge
the right to determine the issue of immunity,136 the Seventh
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees a jury trial in
federal, but not state, civil actions.137 These seemingly
procedural distinctions have both outcome-determinative and
substantive potential consequences; juries, who are less
knowledgeable about specific legal provisions, may be more
sympathetic to plaintiffs than are judges. The Court explained
that the federal judicial system ultimately is independent from
that of the states and therefore, in certain situations, different
rules will inevitably apply in the different courts.138 Litigants
who properly invoke diversity jurisdiction may have their cases
governed, in certain circumstances, by federal rules (that could
be labeled either substantive or procedural).139

132

Id. For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra Part II.
US CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
134
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
135
Id. at 527, 533.
136
Id. at 534.
137
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[T]he right of trial by jury shall be
preserved . . . .”).
138
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. For a discussion of Hanna, see supra Part II. The
Hanna Court, like the Byrd Court, said some divergent federal and state rules were
inevitable in the American federal system.
139
See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38 (“It may well be that in the instant personalinjury case the outcome would be substantially affected by whether the issue of
immunity is decided by a judge or a jury. Therefore, were ‘outcome’ the only
consideration, a strong case might appear for saying that the federal court should
follow the state practice. But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at
work here. . . . An essential characteristic of [the federal] system is the manner in
which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and
jury and, under the influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment,
assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.” (footnote omitted)).
133
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Gasperini: An Illustration of the Court’s Incorporation of
State and Federal Rules

More recently, the Court has demonstrated that it can
use ambiguity within a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure to allow
a state rule limiting jury awards to coexist with the Seventh
Amendment’s reexamination clause.140 In the 1996 diversity case
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,141 the issue concerned the
standard of review to determine whether a new trial should be
ordered because of excessive statutory damages. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59 (Rule 59) gives significant deference to the
common law when designating the standard by which courts
may grant a new trial.142 Based on the provisions of Rule 59,
federal courts have wide discretion to use statutory or common
law provisions in determining whether to grant a new trial.
Indeed, one traditional reason for ordering a new trial is
a reward of excessive damages. Gasperini took place in New
York, and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules section
5501(c)143 permitted trial and appellate courts to order a new
trial if, upon review, the court determined a money award was
“excessive or inadequate” by “‘deviat[ing] materially from what
would be reasonable compensation.’”144 Before the enactment of
section 5501(c) in 1986, New York federal and state trial judges
“invoked the same judge-made formulation in responding to
excessiveness attacks on jury verdicts: courts would not disturb
an award unless the amount was so exorbitant that it shocked
the conscience of the court.”145 Appellate courts would disturb
the trial court’s determination regarding the jury verdict only
where it was obvious that the trial court acted unreasonably in
its discretion.146 However, like the South Carolina federal courts
140

U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.”); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996)
(differentiating the issue in Byrd, which dealt with the Seventh Amendment’s
guarantee of a right to a jury trial in federal civil actions, with the issue in Gasperini,
which dealt with the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause).
141
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
142
For jury trials, Rule 59 permits a court to grant a new trial “for any reason
for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
143
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 2010).
144
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c)); see also id. at
425 (explaining that section 5501(c) applies to New York trial and intermediate
appellate courts).
145
Id. at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146
Id. at 424 (“New York state-court opinions confirm that § 5501(c)’s ‘deviates
materially’ standard calls for closer surveillance than ‘shock the conscience’ oversight.”).
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in Byrd, New York federal courts sitting in diversity faced a
dilemma.147 Section 5501(c) increased the courts’ authority to
review jury awards,148 and in doing so, it potentially infringed
upon the conflicting Seventh Amendment guarantee that jury
verdicts would not be unduly re-examined.149 Rule 59 gave no
clear guidance as to whether a federal court sitting in diversity
should apply the state or traditional federal standard of review
to determine whether a new trial should be ordered because of
excessive damages; either the state or the federal rule were
seemingly permissible.150
Because Rule 59 granted such deference to various
standards of review used by courts, the Gasperini Court analyzed
the divergent standards under the unguided Erie prong and
analyzed whether section 5501(c) was a substantive or procedural
provision. The Court found that New York’s “material deviation”
standard was a procedural provision with substantive
implications.151 The standard used to determine “excessive”
damages could greatly affect the award of damages granted to
parties.152 In turn, this standard obviously affects litigation
strategies, including the decision whether to litigate at all. In
Gasperini, both parties and the Supreme Court “acknowledge[d]
that a statutory cap on damages would supply substantive law for
Erie purposes.”153 The Court noted that section 5501(c) did not
specifically set a maximum recovery amount, but it did provide a
standard by which courts could determine, through case law, if a
damage award was “excessive.”154 The Court explained, “In sum,
147

Id. at 429-30 (“[I]f federal courts ignore the change in the New York
standard and persist in applying the ‘shock the conscience’ test to damage awards on
claims governed by New York law, ‘substantial variations between state and federal
[money judgments]’ may be expected.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965)).
148
Id. at 422-23.
149
Id. at 433; see supra note 140.
150
See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 (explaining that federal law determines the
role of federal trial and appellate courts in reviewing jury verdicts).
151
Id. at 426.
152
Id. at 429-30.
153
Id. at 428. The Court quoted the Reply Brief for Petitioner:
[T]he state as a matter of its substantive law may, among other things,
eliminate the availability of damages for a particular claim entirely, limit the
factors a jury may consider in determining damages, or place an absolute cap
on the amount of damages available, and such substantive law would be
applicable in a federal court sitting in diversity.
Id. at 429.
154

Id. at 429 (concluding that section 5501(c) “differs from a statutory cap
principally in that the maximum amount recoverable is not set forth by statute, but
rather is determined by case law” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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section 5501(c) contains a procedural instruction, . . . but [New
York’s] objective is manifestly substantive.”155 Therefore, the Court
had the constitutional obligation to uphold the Seventh
Amendment, but under the Erie doctrine and the Rules of
Decision Act, it also had the obligation to make a decision that
respected New York’s substantive law.
The Court went on to note that the variation in
standards for evaluating excessive damages implicated the
“twin aims” of Erie, because the two standards would lead to
significantly divergent money judgments in New York state
and federal courts.156 Nonetheless, a purely “outcome
determinative” test was not enough to uphold a state rule over
a federal constitutional guarantee.157 Considering all of these
issues, the Supreme Court reasoned that the federal trial court
judge, present for the jury trial, could ensure that the jury’s
verdict fell within the boundaries set by state law by reviewing a
jury’s award under the material deviation standard established
by section 5501(c).158 However, the Seventh Amendment’s
prohibition of improper reexamination of jury awards159 led the
Court to hold that New York federal appellate courts could not
apply the “material deviation” standard at the appellate stage in
litigation where such a determination would be beyond the jury’s
reach; rather, appellate courts could review the determination of
the federal trial judge only when the trial judge demonstrated
an abuse of discretion.160 Thus, the Supreme Court artfully
incorporated the New York statutory standard of “material
deviation” while remaining true to the Seventh Amendment.161
By acknowledging the substantive nature of section 5501(c) and
the ambiguity of Rule 59, the Court found a way to continue
applying section 5501(c) in federal as well as state courts, even
in light of a potential barrier imposed by the Constitution, the
ultimate American legal authority.
155

Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 430.
157
Id. at 432.
158
Id. at 418.
159
See id. (quoting the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause); see also
supra note 140.
160
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419 (“New York’s law controlling compensation
awards for excessiveness or inadequacy can be given effect, without detriment to the
Seventh Amendment, if the review standard set out in CPLR § 5501(c) is applied by the
federal trial court judge, with appellate control of the trial court’s ruling limited to
review for abuse of discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
161
Id. at 435 (“[A]ppellate review for abuse of discretion is reconcilable with
the Seventh Amendment as a control necessary and proper to the fair administration of
justice . . . .”).
156
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The Failure of the Supreme Court to Apply Gasperini’s
Logic and Find Section 901(b)’s Substantive Aspects

Unlike the Gasperini Court’s interpretation of section
5501(c) as procedural with substantive implications, the Shady
Grove plurality read section 901 to be purely procedural and
therefore in an inevitable clash with Rule 23.162 The Shady
Grove Court could have applied Gasperini’s logic by finding
that section 901(b) encompassed a substantive state concern in
order to let Rule 23 and section 901(b) coexist peacefully.163 Rule
23 by itself does not eliminate possible roles for state law.164
Although the national government is ultimately supreme to the
states in the federalist system, which means that federal law
will at times supersede state law, states still have sovereignty
in numerous areas. Courts may interpret the federal rules
while giving due consideration to state law.165 As Justice
Ginsburg pointed out in the majority opinion of Gasperini,
“Federal rule[s] appl[y] regardless of state law. Federal courts
have interpreted the Federal Rules, however, with sensitivity
to important state interests and regulatory policies.”166 In his
dissent in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh, Inc.,167 Justice
Scalia seemed to endorse precisely this type of narrow reading
of a federal law in order to accommodate state interests.168 He
stated,

162

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1439 (2010) (stating that section 901(b) “undeniably answer[s] the same question as
Rule 23: whether a class action may proceed for a given suit”).
163
See Watkins, supra note 125, at 297 (“Gasperini is properly read as general
command for federal courts to let state policies color their interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure—even when prior interpretations seem to be controlling
authority. And this command applies even more strongly when the Rule at issue is
general and permissive in nature.”).
164
See Steinman, supra note 22, at 1144 (“Shady Grove’s holding that Rule 23
applies to class-certification decisions does not foreclose the possibility that state law
can play a role in Rule 23’s application.”).
165
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
166
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7 (citations omitted); see also Shady Grove,
130 S. Ct. at 1463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167
487 U.S. 22 (1988).
168
The issue in Stewart involved a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) and not a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Id. at 28. However, Scalia’s
inclination to read a congressional statute narrowly and a federal rule broadly is odd,
considering the separation of powers concerns involved in promulgating the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 16, at 43-44 (“[I]t is
reasonable to impute to Congress a concern for protecting state lawmaking choices that
affect state substantive rights, since that body often invokes federalism as warranting
solicitude for state prerogatives. But that is a secondary consequence of the Enabling
Act’s primary concern, which is preventing the Supreme Court, exercising delegated

2012]

SHADY GROVE

807

[T]here is nothing unusual about having the applicability of a federal
statute depend on the content of state law. We have recognized that
precisely this is required when the application of the federal statute
depends, as here, on resolution of an underlying issue that is
fundamentally one of state law.169

Further, Rule 23’s very terms do not set a bright-line
procedural rule. Rather, Rule 23 illustrates the vague line
between (1) substance and procedure and (2) statutory law and
common law.170 For instance, Rule 23(a) mandates that before a
class may be certified, it must satisfy all four of the following
requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation.171 As an additional requirement of
certification, a class must satisfy one of the requirements of
Rule 23(b). The plaintiffs in Shady Grove relied on Rule
23(b)(3), which specifically states, “[Q]uestions of law or fact
common to class members [must] predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”172 Obviously, words
such as predominate and superior do not offer a map to neat
and explicitly clear determinations.173 Indeed, the Rule 23
guidelines for class certification do not offer a clear-cut set of
instructions in themselves—the instructions are rather based
on case law.174 Therefore, as Professor Adam Steinman explains,

legislative power to promulgate court rules, from encroaching upon Congress’s
lawmaking prerogatives.”).
169
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 35 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
170
Likewise, Rule 59’s standard for granting a new trial and the Seventh
Amendment’s Reexamination Clause, both at issue in Gasperini, also illustrates these
ambiguities.
171
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see also
Steinman, supra note 22, at 1144 (“Rule 23(a) mandates that all class actions must
satisfy four elements: ‘numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.’” (quoting Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437)).
172
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Steinman, supra note 22, at 1144-45
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
173
Steinman, supra note 22, at 1145 (“No precise formula is provided for how
a court should measure whether common issues ‘predominate,’ or how a court should
balance the costs and benefits of class treatment to decide whether a class action would
be ‘superior.’”). For a list of factors in Rule 23 that courts use in the superiority
analysis, see supra note 9; Steinman, supra note 22, at 1145 n.78 (“Rule 23 does
provide a non-exhaustive list of factors that are ‘pertinent’ to the superiority
inquiry . . . . [However], these factors do not foreclose the incorporation of state law into
the superiority analysis.”).
174
Steinman, supra note 22, at 1145 (explaining that the federal courts place
a “judicial gloss” upon class action certification that dictates over the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
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[T]here is a difference between state law conflicting with a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (which triggers the REA’s “substantive
rights” standard) and state law conflicting with the federal
judiciary’s gloss on a Federal Rule whose text provides only a vague
or ambiguous standard (which triggers the more state-friendly “twin
aims” standard). If the vague standard set forth in the Federal Rule
can be applied in a way that is consistent with state law, then the
Federal Rule does not truly collide with state law.175

By ignoring this important point, the Shady Grove
decision precluded New York from legislating in a substantive
area. In Gasperini, New York law guided the court to
determine the standard for excessive damages as a means of
granting a new trial under Rule 59 in light of section 5501(c)
and the Seventh Amendment. The same application of state
law could have been used in Shady Grove: section 901(b) could
have led the court to determine that class action was not a
superior means of pursuing a claim under Rule 23.176 The Shady
Grove plaintiffs relied upon the superiority requirement of Rule
23(b), and it is this provision that opens an area for state law.177
New York, or other state law,178 could inform the court’s
decision on whether class action would be “superior” to
individual actions.179 Just as the Gasperini court determined
that a state law could inform Rule 59 and the Seventh
Amendment, the Shady Grove Court could have determined
175

Id. at 1145-46; see also Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration
Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1082 (2011) (“The
important point remains that, even without a bar on class certification for statutory
damages, the terms of Rule 23 make class certification far from a sure thing.”); Patrick
Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723,
1743 (2006) (stating that the denying certification based on the “superiority” provision of
Rule 23(b) “rests on the premise that federal courts should allow the substantive
law . . . to be developed state-by-state rather than using the law of the forum to resolve all
the claims”); York-Erwin, supra note 10, at 1809 (“[S]uperiority analysis under Rule 23(b)
should not turn primarily on conservation of judicial resources.”).
176
See Steinman, supra note 22, at 1147 (“How federal courts . . . decide
whether a class action would be ‘superior’ in any given case is not dictated by Rule 23
itself. For a state-law claim . . . state law might inform whether class treatment is
superior for class-certification purposes . . . .”).
177
Nagareda, supra note 175, at 1075; see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of
Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 46-47 (Univ. of
Penn. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-28),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665092 (“With statutes, judges apply the law but
do not make it. . . . With judge-made law, however, they make the law and are free to
make the priority decision on their own. . . . Without legislative guidance, the priority
determination is a policy decision, and unsurprisingly judges have been guided by policyErie in deciding the extent to which their judge-made rules should displace otherwiseapplicable state law. That is exactly the reasoning we see in Walker and Gasperini.”).
178
See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 22, at 1147 (“This logic would also apply
when (unlike in Shady Grove) state law is more permissive of class actions.”).
179
Id. at 1146-47.
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that New York law spoke directly to the “superiority”
requirement of Rule 23(b), particularly in light of the fact that
Rule 23(a) and 23(b) both state that a class action “may” (not
“must”) be maintained upon meeting certain requirements.180
Justice Ginsburg drew attention to this flaw in Justice
Scalia’s reasoning. Section 901(b), like section 5501(c) at issue
in Gasperini, was a procedural mechanism with substantive
objectives. Justice Ginsburg stated,
Rule 23 authorizes class treatment for suits satisfying its
prerequisites because the class mechanism generally affords a fair
and efficient way to aggregate claims for adjudication. Section 901(b)
responds to an entirely different concern; it does not allow class
members to recover statutory damages because the New York
Legislature considered the result of adjudicating such claims en
masse to be exorbitant. The fair and efficient conduct of class
litigation is the legitimate concern of Rule 23; the remedy for an
infraction of state law, however, is the legitimate concern of the
State’s lawmakers and not of the federal rulemakers.181

Justice Ginsburg further explained the theoretical and
constitutional problems behind Justice Scalia’s formalistic
approach to the facts of Shady Grove. She noted that even under
the Hanna prong, Justice Scalia’s interpretation failed to uphold
the provisions of the Rules Enabling Act that prohibit federal
rules from “abridg[ing], enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] state
substantive rights.”182 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg invoked the
limitations imposed on the national government by the system of
federalism and on the judiciary by the separation of powers. She
stated, “[Justice Scalia’s interpretation] ignores the balance that
Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and
respect for a State’s construction of its own rights and remedies.
It also ignores the separation-of-powers presumption and
federalism presumption that counsel against judicially created
rules displacing state substantive law.”183 Although Congress
delegated the power to write the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to the judiciary, Justice Ginsburg duly noted, as did

180

FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1466 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also id. (“It is relevant
‘whether the state provision embodies a substantive policy or represents only a
procedural disagreement with the federal rulemakers respecting the fairest and most
efficient way of conducting litigation.’” (quoting Ely, supra note 55, at 722)).
182
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
183
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
181
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the Erie Court, that the Court did not have the authority to
make substantive law that could overcome state legislation.184
Justice Ginsburg identified section 901(b) as
substantive rather than procedural by examining its legislative
history. She wrote,
[S]uits seeking statutory damages are arguably best suited to the
class device because individual proof of actual damages is
unnecessary. New York’s decision instead to block class-action
proceedings for statutory damages therefore makes scant sense, except
as a means to a manifestly substantive end: Limiting a defendant’s
liability in a single lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant
inflation of penalties-remedies the New York Legislature created
with individual suits in mind.185

The nature of damages in class actions renders them
inherently substantive. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
statutory damages pose a particularly unique problem for
defendants in class actions: “When representative plaintiffs
seek statutory damages, pressure to settle may be heightened
because a class action poses the risk of massive liability
unmoored to actual injury.”186 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s
formalistic reading of the procedural aspects of Rule 23 ignores
the substantive realities of class actions, which states intend to
regulate through various rules.187 For example, Justice Scalia
failed to acknowledge “the monumental pressure that class
certification imposes on defendants to settle—a dominant
factor in the practical dynamics of class litigation—or the
decades of efforts by courts . . . to shape class action practice to
avoid compromising important policies bound up in the
substantive law.”188 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg pointed out
that in Gasperini, both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia
indicated that statutory damages were indeed a substantive,
rather than a procedural issue.189 In Gasperini, Justice Stevens
stated, “A state-law ceiling on allowable damages . . . is a
substantive rule of decision that federal courts must apply in

184

For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra Part II.
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also id. 1465 n.3 (“[A] class action can result in ‘potentially ruinous
liability.’ A court’s decision to certify a class accordingly places pressure on the
defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims.” (citation omitted)).
186
Id. at 1465 n.3.
187
Watkins, supra note 125, at 285-86.
188
Burbank & Wolff, supra note 16, at 65 (footnote omitted). For a discussion
of CAFA’s legislative history and purpose, see infra Part IV.A.
189
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
185
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diversity cases governed by New York law.”190 Justice Scalia
wrote, “State substantive law controls what injuries are
compensable and in what amount.”191 Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens’s broad, inherently procedural reading of Rule 23 in
Shady Grove contradicts both the ambiguity surrounding the
“superiority” requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)192 and their former
analysis regarding the substantive state interest in
determining limitations on damages.193
Despite
significant
precedent
that
called
for
accommodating state interests and that defines statutory
damages as a substantive state interest, the plurality opinion in
Shady Grove misappropriated precedent in the Erie choice-oflaw cases—including Gasperini—and stopped short of finding
section 901(b) a substantive provision.194 Even though New York
tried to prohibit cases such as Shady Grove from proceeding as
class actions through section 901(b), the Supreme Court
permitted it to proceed in federal court under Rule 23. The
Court’s decision in Shady Grove is problematic in its
consequences as well as in its misapplication of precedent. First,
it violates the twin aims of Erie because it will increase forum
shopping and the inequitable distribution of the laws.195 With the
Shady Grove decision, the Supreme Court made it easier to
pursue a class action in federal court sitting in diversity than in
the state court of New York, whose legislature created the cause
of action. Further, the Court’s decision perverted the legislative
intent behind CAFA, which sought to establish federal
jurisdiction to protect defendants in states with laws favoring
plaintiffs in pursuing nationwide class actions.196
IV.

SOLUTION: AMEND CAFA TO PREVENT SIMILAR
MISTAKES AND TO UPHOLD STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The Shady Grove plurality treated the issue of class
actions, sui generis, as solely that of a clash between Rule 23
and section 901(b). However, the opinion peculiarly ignores
190

Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 439-40 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
191
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 464 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Shady Grove, 130 S.
Ct. at 1472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). For the full text of Rule 23, see supra note 9.
193
See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
194
For a discussion of Scalia’s interpretation of section 901(b) as procedural,
see supra Part III.A.
195
For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra Part II.
196
For a discussion of CAFA’s legislative history and purpose, see infra Part IV.A.
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CAFA, the law that allowed the case to proceed in federal court
in the first place. While the interest owed to Shady Grove was
only about $500, Shady Grove was able to pursue its claim in
New York federal court as a class action under CAFA’s
provision that permits claims to be brought in federal courts as
long as minimum diversity is met, the class contains at least
one hundred members, and the amount in controversy
aggregates to at least $5 million.197 Although Congress enacted
CAFA to curb abusive practices pursued by some plaintiffs’
lawyers in class-action friendly states, the Shady Grove
decision completely undermines both the legislative intent
behind CAFA and the federalism principles embodied in the
“twin aims” of Erie. Therefore, Congress should amend CAFA
(which already contains several carve-outs that incorporate
considerations of local interests) in order to ensure that any
class action brought in federal court could also be maintained
in the forum’s state courts.
A.

CAFA Legislative History

Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 in “response to the
perceived evils of damage class actions run amok.”198 Between
the 1970s and 1990s, plaintiffs increasingly sued corporate
defendants for damages,199 and class actions increased in both
federal and state courts as “[b]road rules of personal
jurisdiction allowed plaintiffs to sue most national corporations
in state or federal court anywhere in the country. In these early
years, many judges—both state and federal—favored the
damage class as a useful mechanism for resolving mass torts
and consumer claims.”200 By the 1990s, however, state and
federal courts began to hand down different results, even
though they both applied the same choice-of-law rules.201 While
federal courts increasingly began to move away from
nationwide damage class certification, some state courts
became more open to class action certification requests.202 Thus,
the decisions issued by federal courts created significant

197

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006).
York-Erwin, supra note 10, at 1802.
199
See id. at 1830 n.1 (“Damage classes seek primarily money damages,
rather than injunctive relief, under Rule 23(b)(3).” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200
Id. at 1802 (footnote omitted).
201
Id.
202
Id.
198
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precedent disfavoring nationwide classes.203 In turn, plaintiffs’
attorneys began to file nationwide class actions in state courts,
obviously shopping for the states that had the friendliest
certification rules and laws supportive of plaintiffs.204
Federal legislators saw the numerous abuses in state
courts that result from divergent state rules regarding damageclass certification.205 States with pro-plaintiff rules and laws
were creating precedent in nationwide class actions that bound
other states, thus creating federalism concerns by interfering
with the sovereignty of other states.206 Through plaintifffriendly class action laws, some states had rules that led to bias
against out-of-state defendants.207 Further, certification of a
damage class leads defendants to settle,208 which in turn yields
203

See id.
Id. at 1803; see also Burbank, supra note 125, at 1508 (“[F]or a time at
least, some plaintiff class action lawyers were successful in securing certifications in
multistate class actions that could not have been certified under developing federal
class action jurisprudence.”); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of
Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2376 (2008) (“Litigant use of
procedure to obtain perceived tactical advantage is most familiar in the much-maligned
practice of ‘forum shopping.’ Strategic choice of forum is utilized by both plaintiffs and
defendants. Plaintiffs choose to file their complaint in the forum they think will be
most hospitable.” (footnote omitted)); Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law in National
Class Actions: Should CAFA Make a Difference?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 54, 55
(2009) (“Interstate forum-shopping in class action litigation has occurred for various
reasons—most notably a group of ‘magnet’ state courts that became attractive to
plaintiffs’ lawyers because of the ease of obtaining certification of a nationwide class.”).
205
Silberman, supra note 204, at 56-57 (“The premise underlying CAFA is
that the federal courts will be less biased and parochial than the state courts have been
with respect to the certification of ‘nationwide’ classes.”).
206
See Cabraser, supra note 51, § 9:28(a)(4) (explaining the federalism
concerns that gave rise to CAFA’s enactment, including the fact that some states were
keeping class actions dealing with national interests out of federal court, some state
laws exhibited prejudice against out-of-state defendants, and states were making
decisions that bound other states); see also Burbank, supra note 125, at 1511 (“In [an]
increasingly entrepreneurial and competitive environment . . . a state court class action
[that] was settled first [could have] preclusive effect.”); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E.
Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An
Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1733 (2008)
(“Congress explicitly found that abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial
system because State and local courts are keeping cases of national importance out of
Federal court and making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States
and bind the rights of the residents of those States.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Silberman, supra note 204, at 66 (“[T]he Senate Report on CAFA noted the
trend toward nationwide class actions, which invite one state court to dictate to 49
others what their laws should be on a particular issue, thereby undermining basic
federalism principles.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Woolley, supra note 175, at
1726 (“The legislative history of CAFA purports to document a number of state court
abuses with respect to class suits, including state decisions applying the law of one
state to claims in nationwide class suits.” (footnote omitted)).
207
Roosevelt III, supra note 177, at 53 (citing CAFA § 2(a)(2)).
208
Silberman, supra note 204, at 63 (“[I]t is universally acknowledged that
certification of a class is often the catalyst for settlement.”).
204
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enormous rewards to plaintiffs’ attorneys.209 Because class
actions often lead defendants to settle, plaintiffs’ lawyers used
this tactic and pursued a strategy of forum shopping to benefit
themselves.210 To address this abusive strategy by plaintiffs’
attorneys, CAFA allows defendants to remove class actions to
federal court in order to prevent plaintiffs from horizontal
forum shopping as a means of pursuing class actions in
plaintiff-friendly state jurisdictions.211

209

For Justice Ginsburg’s argument that the pressure put on defendants to
settle in class actions is a substantive area of state concern, see supra Part III.D; see
also Cabraser, supra note 51, § 9:28(a)(3) (stating that one of the reasons Congress
enacted CAFA was to correct the harm or lack of benefit that class members often
experience in light of the large fees granted to attorneys and to some plaintiffs at the
expense of others); Lee & Willging, supra note 206, at 1734 (“A 2003 . . . survey of
attorneys in recently terminated class actions yielded a finding that the median
recovery in class action settlements was $800,000 and that 75% of the settlements were
valued at less than $5.2 million.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1991) (“Over the past
decade a number of scholars . . . have recognized that the single most salient
characteristic of class . . . litigation is the existence of ‘entrepreneurial’ plaintiffs’
attorneys. Because these attorneys are not subject to monitoring by their putative
clients, they operate largely according to their own self-interest, subject only to
whatever constraints might be imposed by bar discipline, judicial oversight, and their
own sense of ethics and fiduciary responsibilities.” (footnote omitted)).
210
Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the
Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 98 (2009) (“CAFA was intended to respond to perceived abuses
in class action practice, specifically to the perceptions that plaintiffs engage in forum
shopping and that too many class action settlements are approved in which substantial
fees are granted to the plaintiff lawyers at the expense of the plaintiffs.”); see also
Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593,
1593-94 (2008) (“CAFA, like every other major class action development of recent years,
was born amidst snide remarks about lawyers’ inventing lawsuits and manipulating
the system to enrich themselves at others’ expense. Politicians and other CAFA
proponents called class action lawyers self-interested, unscrupulous, unprincipled, and
unaccountable.” (footnotes omitted)); Silberman, supra note 204, at 55 (“Interstate
forum-shopping in class action litigation has occurred for various reasons—most
notably a group of ‘magnet’ state courts that became attractive to plaintiffs’ lawyers
because of the ease of obtaining certification of a nationwide class.”); Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2008) (“As has been extensively analyzed, aggregate
litigation can create a serious misalignment between the interests of class counsel and
the interests of the absentees they represent, a mismatch that in turn can lead class
counsel to sacrifice the welfare of the class in return for personal gain.”).
211
Silberman, supra note 204, at 56-57. For a discussion of vertical forum
shopping, see supra Part II. CAFA’s purpose, to prevent horizontal forum shopping,
differs from the goal to prevent vertical forum shopping as espoused by the twin aims of
Erie. Horizontal forum shopping occurs when plaintiffs choose to pursue claims in a
particular state that is known for plaintiff-friendly laws. Vertical forum shopping, which
the twin aims of Erie sought to prevent, occurs when plaintiffs choose to pursue claims in
federal court over state court because of friendlier federal laws. See supra note 60.
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CAFA indicates that class actions invoke substantive
concerns.212 CAFA includes “a litany of complaints about alleged
‘abuses of the class action device’ that have ‘harmed class
members with legitimate claims and defendants that have
acted responsibly; adversely affected interstate commerce; and
undermined public respect for our judicial system.’”213 CAFA
emphasizes that federal courts are the appropriate venue for
“interstate cases of national importance under diversity
jurisdiction.”214 Thus, CAFA targets multistate or nationwide
class actions, where choice-of-law issues can be complex, and
the state law often applied would have a preclusive effect,
superseding the applicable laws of other states.215 This effect
creates a particular problem when “[t]he court might . . . decide
that a single state’s law should govern the entire action when,
had the claims been brought individually, it would have
decided them under multiple different laws.”216 While it may
address some of these issues, CAFA can be seen as
overinclusive, because “it applies to all state courts, not just
problem jurisdictions. Furthermore, it applies to all class
actions, not merely to duplicative state and federal class
actions. . . . In short, CAFA is directed toward every class
action, not just those circumstances in which problems have
been identified.”217 Shady Grove exemplifies the overinclusive
problem inherent in CAFA. Shady Grove did not involve
multistate litigation, and the limitations on damages set by
section 901(b) demonstrate that New York did not have
particularly plaintiff-friendly class action laws.
Shady Grove presents a unique problem seemingly not
contemplated by the drafters of CAFA. The issue in Shady
212

Burbank, supra note 125, at 1442 (“Even if [class action] rules do not
change substantive law directly, they can change the practical enforcement of
substantive rights, whether by enabling plaintiffs to sue who would not otherwise be
able to do so, or by exercising irresistible pressure on defendants to settle cases that
they regard as lacking in merit.”); Watkins, supra note 125, at 287 (“The class action
defies easy classification under the traditional substance-procedure divide. . . . Like
statutes of limitations, pleading standards, and other rules of a procedural flavor, class
actions have always served purposes beyond docket control.”).
213
Roosevelt III, supra note 177, at 52-53 (quoting CAFA § 2(a)(2)).
214
Id. at 53 (quoting CAFA § 2(a)(2)).
215
Id.
216
Id. at 54. For Justice Scalia’s assertion that class actions do not alter legal
rights but simply offer a means of joinder, see supra Part III.A. Justice Scalia’s
contention conflicts with the reality of the problems inherent in choice of law decisions
and federalism concerns that arise in nationwide class actions.
217
Timothy Kerr, Cleaning Up One Mess to Create Another: Duplicative Class
Actions, Federal Courts’ Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 29
HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 255 (2006) (footnote omitted).
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Grove involved a straightforward state claim with substantive
limitations set by the New York legislature.218 Therefore, the
Eastern District of New York and the Second Circuit both
logically concluded that section 901(b) governed the issue and
prevented Shady Grove from pursuing its claim as a class
action. Of course, Shady Grove was still free to pursue its
individual claim for $500 against Allstate in New York state
court.219 Justice Ginsburg wrote, “Congress surely never
anticipated that CAFA would make federal courts a mecca for
suits of the kind Shady Grove has launched: class actions
seeking state-created penalties for claims arising under state
law-claims that would be barred from class treatment in the
State’s own courts.”220 In effect, CAFA has “prevent[ed] states
from interpreting and effectuating their laws through their
own courts, thus interfering considerably with their
sovereignty.”221 The Supreme Court’s rigid reading of the “clash”
between Rule 23 and section 901(b) perverts the legislative
intent behind CAFA, the very provision that gave the Shady
Grove plaintiffs the option of pursuing their claim in federal
court.222 Moreover, it permits the federal government to
supersede a state law, even though the cause of action arose
under state law, thus significantly infringing upon state
authority as granted in the constitutional system of federalism
under the Tenth Amendment.
B.

The Twin Aims of Erie Weigh in Favor of Section 901(b)
Over Rule 23

When deciding an Erie choice-of-law case, the crucial
threshold question—whether to analyze the case under the

218

For a discussion of Shady Grove’s background and facts, see supra Part I.
See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 175, at 1070-71 (“Insofar as legislative
materials reveal, the notion behind § 901(b) is to avoid remedial overkill—the addition
of class treatment to a remedy already designed to provide an aggrieved party with a
sufficient incentive to pursue a claim, so as to generate a whopping level of potential
liability in the aggregate.” (citation omitted)).
220
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1473 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221
Kerr, supra note 217, at 256; see also Justin D. Forlenza, CAFA and Erie:
Unconstitutional Consequences?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2006) (“CAFA’s
practical effect will be to usurp the state judiciary’s primary role of creating and
developing the substantive law in those areas. Thus, the statute will force federal
courts to create and develop substantive federal common law.”).
222
For an explanation of the problems created by plaintiffs who use horizontal
forum shopping to pursue class actions, see supra Part IV.A. CAFA did not target states
like New York that attempted to restrict plaintiffs’ abilities to pursue class actions.
219

2012]

SHADY GROVE

817

Hanna prong or the unguided Erie prong—substantially affects
the outcome of the decision, as exemplified by Shady Grove.223 By
analyzing the issue under the Hanna prong, the Court favored
the application of federal law, particularly because the Court
has never invalidated a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.224 On
the other hand, if the Court had followed the unguided Erie
prong, like Justice Ginsburg, it most likely would have
permitted Rule 23 and section 901(b) to coexist and would have
applied the state rule in order to uphold the twin aims of Erie.225
“If the choice between federal and state class-action law had
been categorized as an unguided Erie choice, then Shady Grove
would have been a 9-0 decision that federal class-action
standards must yield to New York’s section 901(b).”226
All nine justices pointed out that the Shady Grove decision
would encourage vertical forum shopping, a violation of the “twin
aims” of Erie.227 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia stated, “The short of
the matter is that a federal rule governing procedure is valid
whether or not it alters the outcome of the case in a way that
induces forum shopping.”228 Further, Justice Scalia wrote,
[Forum shopping] is unacceptable when it comes as the consequence
of judge-made rules created to fill supposed gaps in positive federal
law. For where neither the Constitution, a treaty, nor a statute
provides the rule of decision or authorizes a federal court to supply
one, state must govern because there can be no other law. But
divergence from state law, with the attendant consequence of forum
shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended)
result of a uniform system of federal procedure.229

223

See Steinman, supra note 22, at 1143 (“Shady Grove confirms how crucial
Erie’s threshold question can be.”).
224
For a discussion of the Court’s resistance to invalidating a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, see supra Parts II & III.A.
225
For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra notes 53-62 and
accompanying text.
226
Steinman, supra note 22, at 1143.
227
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1447 (2010) (“We must acknowledge the reality that keeping the federal-court door open
to class actions that cannot proceed in state court will produce forum shopping.”); id. at
1459 (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing that class certification “is relevant to the
forum shopping considerations that are part of the Rules of Decision Act or Erie inquiry”);
id. at 1471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As the plurality acknowledges, forum shopping
will undoubtedly result if a plaintiff need only file in federal instead of state court to seek
a massive monetary award explicitly barred by state law.” (citation omitted)).
228
Id. at 1448 (citations omitted) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
473-74 (1965)).
229
Id. at 1447-48 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a
discussion of Hanna’s acceptance of forum shopping as somewhat inevitable in a
federal system, see supra Part II.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens put forward a
similar argument, noting that forum shopping considerations
would concern the court only if a relevant federal rule did not
govern the case.230 Stevens wrote, “As the Court explained in
Hanna, it is an incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins constitutes the appropriate test of the
applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.”231
While Justices Scalia and Stevens correctly stated that
vertical forum shopping is an inevitable consequence in a
supremacy federalist system, their decision in Shady Grove to
read Rule 23 as directly colliding with section 901(b) precluded
the justices from drawing any other conclusion, even though
the Eastern District of New York and the Second Circuit did
not see such a conflict. If the Supreme Court had instead
chosen to read Rule 23 and section 901(b) as coextensive, then
it would have been compelled to favor the application of section
901(b) in this case because the case arises under and is limited
by state laws and rules. Just as they ignored the legislative
intent behind CAFA,232 the plurality in Shady Grove ignored
New York’s substantive state interests behind section 901(b).233
By doing so, they made bypass of New York’s rules easier for
out-of-state plaintiffs through the exploitation of diversity
jurisdiction. The Shady Grove decision gave non–New York
citizen plaintiffs an advantage that New York citizen-plaintiffs
would not have in a similar case arising under New York law
against a New York defendant. In turn, this ability of noncitizen plaintiffs to vertically forum shop also creates an
inequitable distribution of laws in violation of the second aim of
Erie.234 Thus, the Shady Grove decision turned the purposes of
both CAFA and Erie on their heads. 235
C.

Adding a “Shady Grove Carve-Out” to CAFA

While CAFA permits any defendant to remove a case to
federal court where the amount in controversy is at least $5
230

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
232
For a discussion of CAFA’s legislative intent, see supra Part IV.A.
233
For a discussion of New York’s substantive interest behind section 901(b),
see supra Part III.D.
234
See supra Part II.
235
See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Congress
envisioned fewer—not more—class actions overall [by enacting CAFA]. . . . The policy
of Erie precludes maintenance in federal court of suits to which the State has closed its
courts.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
231
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million, there are at least 100 class members, and minimum
diversity is met,236 CAFA also contains several exceptions to
obtaining federal jurisdiction. “Under CAFA, whether federal
jurisdiction is appropriate for class actions brought in the state
where all the primary defendants reside depends upon the
citizenship of the plaintiff class.”237 First, federal courts do not
have jurisdiction when at least two-thirds (aggregated) of the
plaintiffs and all primary defendants are citizens of the forum
state.238 When between one-third and two-thirds of class
members are citizens of the forum state, federal courts may
decline to exercise jurisdiction, based on six factors: (1)
interstate or national interest; (2) whether the claims are under
forum state law; (3) whether the claims have been artfully pled
in order to avoid federal court; (4) whether the forum state has
a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or
the defendants; (5) whether plaintiff citizenship in the
aggregate points to the forum state rather than another state;
and (6) whether any other class actions asserting the same or
similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been
filed in the preceding three years.239 Additionally,
[T]he local controversy exception applies to claims that are unique to the
state where the action is filed. If more than two-thirds of the class
plaintiffs are citizens of the forum state, the court’s focus will shift to the
defendant and the conduct alleged. In order for this exception to apply,
at least one defendant from whom significant relief is sought, and whose
alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the
proposed plaintiff class must be a citizen of the forum state.240

Because CAFA already has a number of carve-outs,
including ones that particularly take local controversies into
account, Congress should amend it to include an additional
carve-out that will avoid a further extension of Shady Grove.
Congress could simply add an exception that states, as
suggested by Justice Ginsburg, that federal courts sitting in
diversity do not have jurisdiction over “claims that could not be
maintained as a class action in [the relevant] state court.”241
Thus, the integrity of CAFA’s purpose would be preserved.
236

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
Ellis, supra note 210, at 101 (footnote omitted).
238
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2006).
239
Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F) (emphasis added).
240
Ellis, supra note 210, at 102 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
241
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1473 n.15 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
237
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Federal courts would continue to have jurisdiction in multistate
class actions, which is an obvious area of federal concern, given
the issue’s substantial interstate-commerce questions.242 Federal
courts would still also have the opportunity, through defendants’
removal motions, to prevent state courts from handing down
opinions that potentially bind other states.243 The carve-out
would continue to protect defendants and plaintiffs from
plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to enrich themselves at the expense
of the parties. Additionally, such an amendment would improve
CAFA by upholding state sovereignty, particularly where, as in
Shady Grove, both the cause of action and limitations on that
cause of action are products of state law.244 This is an important
feature of the proposed amendment, because it respects the
limitations on federal power and the rights of states
characteristic of our federal system.245 Further, it respects
regional differences and local issues by allowing states to create
their own rules as they see fit.246
Finally, by furthering such federalism, this amendment
would also stay true to the “twin aims of Erie.”247 Parties could
no longer seek a forum based on the divergence between
federal and state rules that could lead to markedly different
outcomes when litigating under a state-created right of action.
Thus, the carve-out would increase equity between plaintiffs
and defendants and between out-of-state and in-state parties.
Equitable distribution of the laws and a discouragement of
forum shopping increase the uniformity of applicable laws,
which in turn makes laws more stable.
By narrowly carving out CAFA to prevent class actions
from proceeding in federal court if they could not be
242

Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1765, 1807 (2008) (“[I]t may . . . [be] justified as a matter of jurisdictional
policy to define the exceptions to federal court jurisdiction very narrowly so as to
ensure that [CAFA] jurisdiction reaches all cases that are truly multistate.”).
243
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
244
Watkins, supra note 125, at 296 (“Since class actions have special
connections to substantive rights, federal courts—already sensitive to substantive
rights in interpretation of federal rules—should give class action policies special
solicitude; and in deciding questions of certification, they should look to the
certification law of the state whose substantive law provides the cause of action.”).
245
Silberman, supra note 204, at 63 (“[U]sing aggregation to alter choice of
law . . . . ignores the question of what rights the parties have in the first place and it
undermines the underlying structure of federalism in the United States where the
individual states set the appropriate standards of responsibility and compensation in a
particular area.”).
246
For a discussion of the Erie doctrine and its relationship to federalism, see
supra Part II.
247
For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra Part II.
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maintained in state court, Congress could prevent future
misapplication of Erie choice-of-law cases in class actions that
have federal jurisdiction under CAFA but arise under state
law. While the Shady Grove plurality seems rightly concerned
with preserving the integrity of the Rules Enabling Act,
legitimizing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
promoting the uniformity of rules and efficiency in federal
courts,248 a CAFA carve-out remains true to all of these
interests, because Rule 23 would not change. Further, this
limited restriction on CAFA’s reach does not create confusion
in forcing courts to overly accommodate state rules.249 Quite
simply, a legislative amendment would mean that when
deciding class actions arising solely under state law, courts
would not have to debate whether a federal provision is in
direct collision with a state rule and whether they should
follow the Hanna or unguided Erie prong.250 They would not
have to determine whether the provision at issue is substantive
or procedural: the carve-out itself would acknowledge the
substantive concerns invoked by the class action mechanism.251
Instead of being dragged into “Erie’s murky waters,”252 federal
courts sitting in diversity would simply look to relevant state
law in determining class certification. Thus, the proposed
CAFA carve-out simplifies choice of law issues for federal
courts sitting in diversity and upholds numerous interests
within our system of government, including the legislative
purpose behind CAFA—seeking to protect the system of

248

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1442 (2010) (“What the dissent’s approach achieves is . . . the invalidation of Rule 23
(pursuant to section 2072(b) of the Rules Enabling Act) to the extent that it conflicts
with the substantive policies of section 901.”); id. at 1444 (noting that the substantive
or procedural effect of a federal rule of civil procedure is not the issue in determining its
validity; rather, the issue is whether the rule in itself is procedural); see also Kevin M.
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 1017-18
(2011) (noting that efficiency is served by a uniform system of federal rules that may
always be redrafted based on facial challenges rather than as-applied challenges).
249
For criticisms of the type of confusing balancing tests and over-deference to
state courts seemingly advocated by Gasperini and Byrd, see generally Clermont, supra
note 248; Richard D. Freer & Thomas Arthur, The Irrepressible Myth of Byrd, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 61 (2010); Armando Gustavo Hernandez, The Head-on Collision of
Gasperini and the Derailment of Erie: Exposing the Futility of the Accommodation
Doctrine, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191 (2010); John B. Oakley, Illuminating Shady Grove:
A General Approach to Resolving Erie Problems, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 79 (2010).
250
For a discussion of the development of Erie jurisprudence, see supra Part II.
251
For a discussion of the substantive interests underlying class actions, see
supra Parts III.D and IV.A.
252
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
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federalism—which is inherently implicated in choice-of-law
decisions arising under diversity jurisdiction.253
CONCLUSION
Based on the controversial 2010 decision in Shady
Grove, Congress should amend CAFA. The parties in Shady
Grove were in federal court only because of CAFA’s provision
granting federal jurisdiction where the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million and minimal diversity is met, despite the
fact that plaintiffs were pursuing a cause of action created
under and limited by New York law. If Congress amended
CAFA to deny federal jurisdiction to class actions that could
not be maintained in the state under whose laws the cause of
action at issue arose, then it could uphold the purpose of CAFA
while at the same time respecting the ability of states to
legislate about the substantive issues underlying the use of
class actions as a procedural mechanism. This amendment
would preserve the system of federalism and respect various
precedents acknowledging the substantive nature of statutory
damage limitations. Such a division of power enhances the
government’s ability to address the interests of all of its
citizens and maintains the respective realms of sovereignty.
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Silberman, supra note 204, at 66 (“[T]he Senate Report on CAFA noted the
trend toward nationwide class actions, which invite one state court to dictate to 49
others what their laws should be on a particular issue, thereby undermining basic
federalism principles.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra Part II
(discussing federalism concerns inherent in the Erie doctrine).
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